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ABSTRACT 
Aim
To evaluate the impact of the introduction and withdrawal of financial incentives on alcohol 
screening and brief advice delivery in English primary care.
Design
Interrupted time series using data from The Health Improvement Network (THIN) database. 
Data were split into three periods: 1) before the introduction of financial incentives (1st 
January 2006 to 31st March 2008); 2) during the implementation of financial incentives (1st 
April 2008 to 31st March 2015); and 3) after the withdrawal of financial incentives (1st April 
2015 to 31st December 2016). Segmented regression models were fitted, with slope and 
step change coefficients at both intervention points.
Setting 
England.
Participants
Newly-registered patients (16+) in 500 primary care practices for 2006-2016 (N=4,278,723).
Measurements
The outcome measures were percentage of patients each month who: 1) were screened for 
alcohol use; 2) screened-positive for higher-risk drinking; 3) were reported as having 
received brief advice on alcohol consumption.
Findings
There was no significant change in the percentage of newly-registered patients who were 
screened for alcohol use when financial incentives were introduced. However, the 
percentage fell (p<0.001) immediately when incentives were withdrawn, and fell by a 
further 2.96 (95% CI 2.21-3.70) patients per 1,000 each month thereafter. After the 
introduction of incentives, there was an immediate increase of 9.05 (95% CI 3.87-14.23) per 
1,000 patients screening positive for higher-risk drinking, but no significant further change 
over time. Withdrawal of financial incentives was associated with an immediate fall in 
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screen-positive rates of 29.96 (95% CI 19.56-40.35) per 1,000 patients, followed by a rise 
each month thereafter of 2.14 (95% CI 1.51-2.77) per 1,000. Screen-positive patients 
recorded as receiving alcohol brief advice increased by 20.15 (95% CI 12.30-28.00) per 1,000 
following the introduction of financial incentives, and continued to increase by 0.39 (95% CI 
0.26-0.53) per 1,000 monthly until withdrawal. At this point, delivery of brief advice fell by 
18.33 (95% CI 11.97-24.69) per 1,000 patients and continued to fall by a further 0.70 (95% CI 
0.28-1.12) per 1,000 per month. 
Conclusions
Removing a financial incentive for alcohol prevention in English primary care was associated 
with an immediate and sustained reduction in the rate of screening for alcohol use and brief 
advice provision. This contrasts with no, or limited, increase in screening and brief advice 
delivery rates following the introduction of the scheme.  
Keywords 
Alcohol prevention; interrupted time series; financial incentives; primary healthcare; 
screening; intervention; policy.
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INTRODUCTION 
Alcohol is the seventh leading global risk factor for premature death and disability, and 
causally related to over 60 different medical conditions, including liver cirrhosis, cancer and 
cardiovascular disease (1-4). In a multi-stranded approach to tackling higher-risk drinking, 
primary care is ideally placed for the prevention and early detection of alcohol-related 
problems, due to its high population coverage, accessibility, and the frequency with which 
higher-risk drinkers present to clinicians (5-8). Brief advice in primary care has been shown 
to reduce heavy drinking, alcohol-related problems, healthcare utilization and mortality (9-
11). Yet despite this evidence, which is endorsed by the World Health Organisation (12) and 
embedded in clinical guidelines across Europe, Australasia and the USA (13-16), delivery of 
brief alcohol advice across global health systems remains low (17-19). 
Using financial incentives to boost the delivery of evidence-based interventions in routine 
clinical practice is a common policy strategy in many countries. However, evidence of their 
impact on the quality and efficiency of healthcare remains inconclusive, particularly where 
long-term patient outcomes are concerned (20-23). There is also limited understanding of 
the impact of withdrawing incentives, although data from both the USA and United 
Kingdom (UK) suggest that performance levels are likely to decline, especially for quality 
indicators relating to the provision of health advice (24-26).  
Introduced in 2004, the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is the primary system for 
the performance management and payment of General Practitioners (GPs) in the UK 
National Health Service (NHS) (27). QOF covers a range of smoking prevention indicators, 
however whilst practices are required to record the alcohol status of targeted patient 
groups, such as those with serious mental health conditions, routine implementation of 
alcohol screening and brief advice is excluded. In England, additional priority areas of 
practice not covered by the QOF are incentivised by a further set of opt-in payment 
schemes; the national Directed Enhanced Services (DES) (28). Reflecting their focus on 
preventative care (29), and in response to disappointing rates of alcohol screening and brief 
advice delivery achieved in England (30, 31), in 2008 the Enhanced Services were extended 
to cover higher-risk drinking (32). 
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Under the alcohol DES, participating practices were paid a small fee of £2.38 (approximately 
$3.04 or 2.71) for each newly-registered adult patient they screened to identify higher-risk 
drinking using a validated self-report questionnaire (33). This compares to £140.00 ($176.19 
or 157.08) paid per patient to practices for delivering health checks to people aged 14+ 
with learning disabilities (DES also introduced in 2008), and to a maximum of £11,472.64 
($14,436.29 or 12,872.39) per practice for implementing various smoking identification 
and treatment services. The alcohol DES was withdrawn in April 2015, replaced by a 
requirement for practices to identify newly-registered adult patients drinking above 
recommended levels under the General Medical Services contract (34). Thus whilst GPs are 
still legally obliged to identify and support higher-risk drinkers in England, they are no longer 
specifically financially rewarded for carrying out this work.
There are few published data on the impact of the DES on alcohol prevention work in 
English primary care. One small study conducted in Northern England found that practices 
receiving financial incentives for alcohol work during 2010-2011 recorded higher rates of 
alcohol screening and brief advice delivery compared to those not receiving additional 
payments, although overall, rates remained low (35). However, there has been no nationally 
representative evaluation of either the impact of financial incentives on the full alcohol 
prevention pathway from identification (screening) to intervention (advice), or any potential 
effect of withdrawing the alcohol DES on overall delivery rates.
We sought to assess the impact of the introduction and subsequent withdrawal of financial 
incentives on recorded rates of: 1) newly-registered patients screened for higher-risk 
alcohol consumption; 2) patients screening positive; and 3) delivery of brief alcohol advice in 
English primary care. 
METHODS 
Data source 
We used data from The Health Improvement Network (THIN); a primary care database 
containing electronic patient records from 500+ general practices, approximately six per 
cent of UK patients. It is broadly representative of the national population in terms of age, 
sex, deprivation, and geographical distribution (36). THIN contains details of symptoms, 
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diagnoses, prescriptions, test results, health indicators and the Townsend deprivation index; 
a composite measure of social deprivation presented as quintiles (37). Information can be 
entered by practitioners into the database as free text or codified using alpha-numeric Read 
Codes. Until replaced by SNOMED CT (Systematized Nomenclature of Medicine - Clinical 
Terms) on 1st April 2018, Read Codes were the standard clinical terminology used to record 
care in electronic patient records across all UK general practices (38, 39). 
To ensure that data of an acceptable standard were included for analysis, individual 
practices were only eligible if their data were published after the Acceptable Mortality 
Reporting (AMR) (40) and Acceptable Computer Usage (ACU) dates (41). These are THIN-
specific quality measures of the extent to which mortality data are entered on the computer 
(AMR) and the computer is used for general recording of patient information (ACU). Both 
markers are applied to the data from each general practice. 
Newly-registered patients (defined as within the previous twelve-month period) aged 16 to 
99 years, and registered with a practice that had been contributing data to THIN for at least 
two years prior to the patients registration date, were eligible for inclusion. Owing to low 
numbers of new registrations, and a small number of patient records suggesting implausibly 
high ages, patients with recorded ages of 100+ were excluded from analysis. 
Use of THIN for scientific research was approved by the NHS South-East Multi-Centre 
Research Ethics Committee in 2003. Scientific approval to undertake this study was 
obtained from IQVIA World Publications Scientific Review Committee (SRC) in January 2017 
(SRC Reference Number: 16THIN098).
Outcome measures
The following variables comprised the basis of our outcome indicators:
1. Percentage of eligible patients aged 16+ screened for higher-risk drinking using a 
validated screening questionnaire (42-45) or questions to ascertain their level of 
alcohol consumption;
2. Percentage of screened patients identified as higher-risk drinkers based on UK 
guidelines (13); 
3. Percentage of screen positive patients who received brief advice about their drinking.
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The design of the alcohol DES meant that practices were only required to record their 
screening of newly-registered patients to qualify for payment. By including recorded rates of 
screen positives, and rates of those screen-positives subsequently receiving brief advice, we 
sought to identify whether appropriate patients received support for higher-risk drinking. 
Every recorded consultation was compared against a list of Read Codes corresponding to 
each of the above indicators. This list comprised both the specific Read Codes that practices 
were required to use in order to trigger alcohol DES payments (32), alongside unrefined, 
more inclusive lists of Read codes relating to the identification and treatment of higher-risk 
drinking identified by previous studies (46, 47) and the clinical codes repository (48). A list of 
all Read Codes used in our analyses is provided in supplementary File 1).
Statistical analysis
We used interrupted time series analysis (ITS), a quasi-experimental study design (49, 50). 
We calculated monthly rates (%) and 95% confidence intervals for each outcome indicator 
for the period 1st January 2006 to 31st December 2016.  Rates were plotted graphically to 
allow us to visualise trends over time, including an initial assessment of any change 
occurring pre- and post- the two intervention points of interest: (1) introduction of the 
alcohol DES on 1st April 2008; (2) withdrawal of financial incentives on 31st March 2015. 
We used segmented regression analysis to quantify the magnitude of the impact of the two 
interventions on our outcomes of interest. For ease of interpretation of results, we 
converted outcome measures from proportions to rates per 1,000 patients. Models were 
specified to allow a linear underlying trend in each outcome, and for each intervention to 
have both an immediate change in the outcome and to alter the underlying trend (i.e. to 
change both the intercept and the slope of the fitted trends, see supplementary File 2). We 
hypothesised that the introduction of incentives in 2008 would increase activity rates, and 
that withdrawal in 2015 would reduce their delivery. All models were assessed visually for 
seasonality, and alternative methods to account for these tested (including either harmonic 
functions of the month variable or separate month dummies in the model). Final model 
selection was made on the basis of minimising Bayesian and Akaike Information Criteria 
(51). A Durbin-Watson test (52) suggested some residual autocorrelation, even after 
controlling for seasonality, and we therefore report Newey-West standard errors. As data 
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were aggregated across all THIN practices, there was no need to account for clustering of 
patients within practices in the analysis.
Sensitivity analysis
Initial inspection of the data showed that few consultations had separate Read Codes for 
both a positive screening score and the delivery of alcohol brief advice. We therefore 
conducted a sensitivity analysis where we used the proportion of all patients recorded as 
being screened who had received advice as an outcome, irrespective of whether the 
screening result itself was recorded. Next, as guidelines recommend that very heavy 
drinkers are likely to need support beyond simple brief advice (13), in a further sensitivity 
analysis, we examined the impact of additionally including Read Codes associated with 
referring patients to specialist alcohol treatment services in the definition of receiving 
alcohol brief advice. 
RESULTS
Table 1 shows demographic characteristics of: all patients aged 16-99 in the full THIN 
database (age strata based on age at registration); registered with a new practice between 
1st January 2006 and 31st December 2016; and recorded as experiencing each of the three 
outcome measures (screening, screening positive, receiving alcohol brief advice). This shows 
our patient sample was relatively less deprived but the age spread reflected that found in 
the national population (53). 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Rates for each outcome measure (including 95% confidence intervals) are shown in Figure 1. 
This shows that the screening rate for newly-registered patients remained relatively stable 
until the withdrawal of financial incentives in 2015. Rates of newly-registered patients 
screening positive for higher-risk drinking increased steadily until 2012, then fell back 
slightly before rising sharply at the start of 2016. However, following a time-limited increase 
in recorded intervention delivery to screen-positive patients between 2009-11, rates have 
subsequently declined. In the following section, we assess the significance of these trends.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
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Time trends in alcohol screening
Table 2 shows the full results for the final ITS models for all three outcome measures; 
coefficients represent beta values from the specified linear regression models. Screening 
rates were the only outcome for which a seasonal adjustment was required, with more than 
ten additional screenings per 1,000 patients in September and October than in any other 
month. We speculated that this was potentially related to trends in new registrations 
amongst higher education students at the start of each academic year. Subsequent analysis 
appears to corroborate this, showing both higher rates of registration and higher rates of 
screening in 16-24 year olds in these months compared to the rest of the year, an effect not 
observed in other age groups (see supplementary File 3). 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
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Newly-registered patients screened for heavy drinking 
At the start of the analysis period (1st January 2006), 92 out of every 1,000 eligible patients were 
screened each month, with the screening rate increasing slowly thereafter. There was no 
significant change at the point when financial incentives were introduced in April 2008. However, 
there was a significant (p<0.001) shift in this temporal trend on their withdrawal in March 2015, 
with rates falling by 2.96 (95% CI 2.21-3.70) patients per 1,000 each month thereafter. These 
trends are illustrated in Figure 2. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
It should be noted that these data (Figure 2) represent the proportion of eligible patients screened 
each month during the analysis period. The proportion of patients screened within the eligible 
window (12 months post-registration) was higher, averaging around 65% of all newly-registered 
patients during the DES period (see supplementary File 4). 
Newly-registered patients screening positive for heavy drinking
At the start of the analysis period, 104 in every 1,000 newly-registered patients who were 
screened were also recorded as screening positive for higher-risk drinking. As with the screening 
rate, this increased steadily prior to the introduction of financial incentives. After the introduction 
of incentives, there was an immediate increase of 9.05 (95% CI 3.87-14.23) per 1,000 in the rate of 
screen positives; however there was no significant change in the rate at which this increased over 
time. Withdrawal of financial incentives was associated with a fall in screen positive rates of 29.96 
(95% CI 19.56-40.35) per 1,000 patients but a rise in the monthly increase in this rate of 2.14 (95% 
CI 1.51-2.77) per 1,000. Figure 3 illustrates these trends graphically.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
Delivery of brief alcohol advice to newly-registered screen positive patients 
Fewer than 15 in every 1,000 screen positive patients were recorded as receiving brief advice at 
the start of the analysis period. This rate increased by 20.15 (95% CI 12.30-28.00) per 1000 
patients following the introduction of financial incentives in 2008, and continued to increase by 
0.39 (95% CI 0.26-0.53) per 1,000 each month thereafter up to the point at which incentives were 
withdrawn. At this point, delivery of brief advice fell by 18.33 (95% CI 11.97-24.69) per 1,000 
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patients and continued to fall by a further 0.70 (95% CI 0.28-1.12) per 1,000 per month. Figure 4 
shows these trends. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
Between April 2015 and December 2016, our modelling estimates suggest that 36,223 fewer 
patients were screened, and 1,646 fewer patients received brief advice in our sample THIN 
population than if the incentives had not been withdrawn. 
Sensitivity analyses
Using data on all screened patients who received alcohol brief advice as our denominator, instead 
of only those recorded as screening positive, substantially reduced overall delivery rates, but made 
no substantive difference to our findings. Similarly, including Read Codes relating to specialist 
treatment referrals alongside those for delivery of alcohol brief advice did not meaningfully alter 
our results (see supplementary File 4).
Exploratory analysis
Across all three outcome measures, particularly receipt of alcohol brief advice, visual inspection of 
the delivery rates over time suggested that there may have been a delay in the effect of one or 
both of the interventions (introduction and withdrawal of financial incentives). We therefore used 
Rs changepoint package to identify potential turning points in the time series for each outcome 
(54). This analysis showed some evidence for a lag of around 6 months for the initial effect of the 
introduction of incentives to affect screen positive and brief advice rates, and a potential lag of 7-
10 months for the effect of withdrawing them to be felt (see supplementary File 5).
DISCUSSION
Our analysis of electronic health records shows that the introduction of financial incentives for 
alcohol prevention work had limited success in improving rates of newly-registered patients 
screened for higher-risk drinking in English primary care. However, their withdrawal in March 2015 
saw an immediate and significant drop in rates of both alcohol screening and the delivery of brief 
advice; a downward trend that has continued since. At the end of our analysis period (December 
2016), although general practices are now contractually required to deliver alcohol screening and 
brief advice, fewer than three per cent of patients in our sample identified as drinking above 
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recommended limits were recorded as receiving appropriate support. Scaling-up our findings to 
the English population would suggest that up until the end of 2016, 603,719 fewer adult patients 
were screened for higher-risk drinking, and 27,439 fewer patients received brief advice, as a result 
of terminating the alcohol DES. 
This study represents the first large-scale assessment of the impact of financial incentives on 
alcohol screening and brief advice in primary care. Two studies in England found that using 
incentives targeted at patients with mental health and/or cardiovascular conditions led to a 
significant increase in alcohol screening rates (55, 56). Evidence for the effectiveness of financial 
incentives for alcohol prevention in general primary care populations is more equivocal. The five-
country ODHIN trial reported positive impacts of using incentives to encourage implementation of 
screening and alcohol brief advice (57, 58). However, increases were not fully sustained at the 12-
week follow-up after incentives were withdrawn. Previous research suggests that whilst the 
introduction of financial incentives can stimulate immediate improvements in healthcare, returns 
are likely to stagnate over time (59, 60). One case study in Northern England detected slightly 
higher levels of screening and advice delivery in DES-incentivised compared to non-incentivised 
practices, but found low levels of alcohol prevention activity irrespective of incentive status (35). 
Whilst our findings suggest that overall, screening rates for newly-registered patients within the 
full 12 months post-registration period were relatively high, other studies confirm the low levels of 
screening carried out in the general patient population (19). Further, and importantly, these 
results highlight the significant decline in screening rates since incentives were withdrawn.
No other study has assessed the impact of withdrawing financial incentives on alcohol prevention 
in primary care. There is limited published evidence on what happens when financial incentives 
are removed for healthcare performance in general, and findings to date have conflicted (24-26). 
On balance, it appears that the risks of withdrawing incentives may be small when specific clinical 
practices have already achieved high levels of quality, acceptance and adoption amongst providers 
(26), but outcomes for other aspects of care may be more negative. Two recent evaluations of the 
retirement of a series of QOF indicators found that performance in all areas fell after the incentive 
was removed, but the drop was largest for those indicators generally considered less relevant and 
acceptable to GPs (61), and those associated with the provision of health advice (25). GPs 
resistance to routine implementation of alcohol advice in English primary care is well-documented 
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(19, 35, 62). As such, the sharp downward trend in delivery rates of alcohol screening and brief 
advice once incentives were withdrawn reported here should have been anticipated.
The main strength of our study was the use of a large dataset representing over four million 
newly-registered patients, drawn from a representative sample of several hundred practices. 
Additionally, whilst the randomized controlled trial remains the research gold-standard, 
interrupted time series analysis provides a strong alternative where an experimental study design 
is infeasible or unethical (49), such as the evaluation of policy initiatives in healthcare (50). 
Importantly, our data cover multiple time-points over 11 years of electronic health records. At the 
same time, whilst our analytic approach was pre-specified, we recognise that alternative methods 
exist for the analysis of time series data. These include more complex approaches, such as 
Generalised Additive Mixed Models (GAMM), that can account for higher order autocorrelation 
and more complex seasonal patterns (63).  
Some ecological limitations also exist. In particular, the potential impact of additional or 
competing policies on our outcomes of interest is acknowledged. Between 2006-2016, relevant 
policies include the publication of NICE guidelines for preventing the development of hazardous 
and harmful drinking in June 2010 (13), and the 2012 Alcohol Strategy (64), alongside a change in 
UK Government, and the subsequent reorganisation of primary care and public health in England. 
Additionally, duty rates for several alcoholic beverages were reduced immediately prior to the 
withdrawal of financial incentives in March 2015 (65). However, our change point analysis does 
not provide strong support for a single consistent effect of any of these potentially confounding 
policies across all outcomes. Next, we focussed on new registrants only so are unable to draw 
conclusions with regards to any changes in alcohol screening and advice delivery to existing 
patients. Previous modelling work demonstrates that screening focussed on new registrations 
represents a cost-saving and cost-effective approach to encouraging alcohol prevention in primary 
care, which is less resource-intensive than screening existing patients at their next GP consultation 
(66). Additionally, whilst the THIN dataset is nationally representative, we lack information on 
which practices in our dataset opted into the alcohol DES during the analysis period. However, 
other mandatory schemes would have affected alcohol prevention recording, such as NHS Health 
Checks for patients aged 40-75, irrespective of incentive status. Moreover, since 1st April 2015, all 
practices are required to screen newly-registered as part of their general contractual obligations 
(34).
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There are also limitations of using routine clinical datasets, such as Read Code data, for research 
and evaluation purposes (67). Although UK guidelines require that every clinical encounter is 
recorded on the computer system in primary care (68), there is evidence that the use of pay-for-
performance can distort recoding practice, with clinicians tending to prioritise recording of data 
corresponding to delivery of incentivised areas of care (69). In the case of alcohol screening and 
brief advice, previous research suggests that concerns around the adverse social and legal 
consequences of identifying patients with socially stigmatised conditions (70), and the low priority 
accorded to recording preventative interventions such as alcohol advice (71), has more generally 
resulted in under-coding of care (35). Changes in the Read Codes available for recording alcohol 
activity, such as the introduction of new codes in 2008 as part of the DES specification, also affect 
our ability to evaluate delivery rates accurately (72). However, by employing a comprehensive 
approach to generate lists of Read Codes to assess performance against our outcome measures, 
we sought to minimise the impact of such coding artefacts on analysis. Importantly, publicly 
available data on the delivery of GP Contract Services for the period 2013 to 2018 further 
corroborates the fall we have identified in alcohol screening rates. NHS Digital data show that 74% 
of newly-registered patients were recorded as being screened within 12 months of registration in 
2014-15, but this fell to 48% in 2015-16 after financial incentives were withdrawn (73).
Several factors may have contributed to the low delivery of alcohol screening and brief advice 
delivery in English primary care. First, limited take-up could be linked to the design of the alcohol 
incentive scheme itself. Other studies have reported that the low remuneration levels associated 
with the alcohol DES meant that screening and advice were given lower priority compared to 
other more lucrative areas of primary care, such as those covered by the QOF (35, 62). Further, as 
clinicians were incentivised for screening patients alone, subsequent delivery of alcohol advice 
may have been under-recorded and less prioritised. The distorting effects of incentivising process 
as opposed to outcomes in healthcare have been criticised, including by the current UK 
Government (74). From a public health perspective, there is limited value in rewarding clinicians 
for identifying heavy drinkers if those patients are not subsequently offered appropriate support. 
Second, systematic review findings also suggest that financial incentives are more likely to have a 
positive and sustained impact when they target practices: where a robust evidence base exists; 
that align with organisational goals; and have strong provider support (20, 75, 76). In the case of 
alcohol prevention, although more than 70 RCTs have shown that primary care-based screening 
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and brief advice is clinically- and cost-effective (9), there is less evidence that clinicians themselves 
are willing to devote limited consultation time to their provision (77). Moreover, even in areas of 
practice that have strong support, evidence from behavioral economics highlights the risk that 
using extrinsic (monetary) incentives to encourage performance may conversely reduce (crowd-
out) a clinicians intrinsic motivation to deliver care, particularly over the longer-term (78-80).
Third and finally, for policymakers considering using short-term incentives to boost clinicians 
delivery of preventative healthcare practices, our study further highlights the potential for 
substantial adverse effects on service provision once payments are withdrawn (81). Adding such 
practices to clinicians contractual obligations to ensure their continued delivery is an important 
first step, but must be closely monitored thereafter, with clear penalties enforced for under-
performance. In England, the government introduced another time-limited pay-for-performance 
scheme for screening and brief advice provision in secondary care via the NHS Commissioning for 
Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) alcohol indicator (82), despite less clear evidence for effectiveness 
compared to primary care settings (83). Until March 2020, secondary care providers will receive a 
payment based on the percentage of eligible adult patients admitted for at least one night and 
asked about their alcohol use, and subsequently given advice or offered specialist support as 
appropriate. Given the results reported here, we suggest any future changes to the alcohol CQUIN 
are implemented with care.
CONCLUSION
Removing a financial incentive for alcohol prevention led to an immediate and sustained reduction 
in recorded rates of screening and brief advice delivered to newly-registered patients in English 
primary care. This contrasts with the limited and gradual gains achieved by the original 
introduction of the scheme. These findings highlight the potential adverse consequences of using 
short-term financial incentives to boost implementation of alcohol prevention in primary 
healthcare.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1 - Demographic characteristics of included patients: n(%)
Newly-registered 
patients 
(N=4,278,723)
Patients 
screened for 
heavy drinking 
(N=2,510,055)
Patients 
screening 
positive for heavy 
drinking 
(N=212,179)
Patients 
receiving Brief 
Intervention 
(N=23,208)
Mean age (SD) * 39.9 (18.8) 37.5 (16.5) 37.9 (14.7) 38.3 (15.7)
16-24 994544 (23.2)% 587707 (23.4)% 44650 (21)% 5023 (21.6)%
25-34 1177382 (27.5)% 789137 (31.4)% 59063 (27.8)% 6527 (28.1)%
35-44 723348 (16.9)% 451124 (18)% 44024 (20.7)% 4374 (18.8)%
45-54 467306 (10.9)% 276422 (11)% 31704 (14.9)% 3335 (14.4)%
55-64 350280 (8.2)% 189885 (7.6)% 20691 (9.8)% 2225 (9.6)%
65-74 250973 (5.9)% 112466 (4.5)% 9066 (4.3)% 1180 (5.1)%
75-99 314890 (7.4)% 103314 (4.1)% 2981 (1.4)% 544 (2.3)%
Female 2322459 (54.3%) 1354510 (54%) 82444 (38.9%) 9855 (42.5%)
Townsend Q1 (least 
deprived)
709025 (19.4)% 388700 (17.9)% 37388 (20.3)% 2695 (12.7)%
Townsend Q2 715949 (19.6)% 394543 (18.2)% 35551 (19.3)% 3484 (16.5)%
Townsend Q3 827178 (22.7)% 490743 (22.6)% 42017 (22.8)% 4787 (22.6)%
Townsend Q4 802933 (22)% 504983 (23.3)% 39844 (21.6)% 5425 (25.6)%
Townsend Q5 (most 
deprived)
592206 (16.2)% 389004 (17.9)% 29690 (16.1)% 4786 (22.6)%
* Age at date of registration
Page 21 of 37 Addiction
For Review
 O
nly
 
22
Figure 1: Rates of eligible patients a) screened; b) screening positive; c) receiving alcohol brief advice 1st January 
2006  31st December 2016.
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Table 2: Final Interrupted Time Series models for primary outcomes
Eligible patients screened Screened patients screening positive
Screen positive patients receiving 
intervention
Coefficient p-value 95% CI Coefficient p-value 95% CI Coefficient p-value 95% CI
Months since 1st Jan 2006 0.42 0.045 0.01 0.82 0.53 <0.001 0.40 0.67 -0.13 0.193 -0.32 0.07
Effect of intervention 1 0.82 0.825 -6.51 8.14 9.05 0.001 3.87 14.23 20.15 <0.001 12.30 28.00
Months since intervention 1 
introduced
-0.29 0.170 -0.70 0.13 0.03 0.722 -0.14 0.20 0.52 <0.001 0.29 0.76
Effect of intervention 2 -1.19 0.759 -8.84 6.46 -29.96 <0.001 -40.35 -19.56 -18.33 <0.001 -24.69 -11.97
Months since intervention 2 
introduced
-2.96 <0.001 -3.70 -2.21 2.14 <0.001 1.51 2.77 -1.10 <0.001 -1.54 -0.66
Intercept 92.49 <0.001 85.98 99.00 104.08 <0.001 102.28 105.89 14.35 <0.001 11.32 17.38
Monthly effects (vs. January)
February -6.54 0.026 -12.29 -0.78
March -2.04 0.524 -8.37 4.28
April -11.24 <0.001 -17.04 -5.44
May -12.65 <0.001 -18.54 -6.76
June -9.28 <0.001 -14.10 -4.46
July -5.40 <0.001 -10.17 -0.62
August -6.52 0.027 -12.14 -0.90
September 18.64 <0.001 11.44 25.83
October 11.64 <0.001 5.60 17.69
November 0.17 0.952 -5.42 5.76
December -21.00 <0.001 -26.95 -15.06
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Figure 2: Eligible patients screened between 1st January 2006 and 31st December 2016: Observed (black dots) and 
modelled screening rates with (dashed red line) and without (solid red line) seasonal adjustment 
Figure 3: Eligible screen positive patients between 1st January 2006 and 31st December 2016: Observed (black dots) 
and modelled (red line) 
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Figure 4: Brief advice delivery to eligible patients between 1st January 2006 and 31st December 2016: Observed 
(black dots) and modelled (red line) trends 
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Supplementary file (1) List of Read Codes used in Analyses
Table 1: All Alcohol Screening Read Codes
Read Code Description Value1
Male Female Upper
Incentivised (DES) Alcohol Screening Read Codes2
388u.00 Fast alcohol screening test 3 3 16
9k15.00 Alcohol screen - AUDIT completed 8 8 40
9k16.00 Alcohol screen - fast alcohol screening test 
completed
3 3 16
9k17.00 Alcohol screen - AUDIT C completed 5 5 12
Non-incentivised Alcohol Screening Read Codes3
38D2.00 Single alcohol screening questionnaire 1 1 1
38D3.00 Alcohol use disorders identification test 8 8 40
38D4.00 Alcohol use disorder identificatn test 
consumptn questionnre
5 5 12
38D5.00 Alcoh use disor id test Piccinelli consumption 
questionaire
5 5 20
38Df.00 Five-shot questionnaire on heavy drinking 2.5 2.5 5
8IH4.00 Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test 
declined
9k1..00 Alcohol misuse - enhanced services 
administration
9k12.00 Alcohol misuse - enhanced service completed
9k13.00 Alcohol questionnaire completed
9k18.00 Alcohol screen - AUDIT PC completed
9k19.00 Alcohol assessment declined - enhanced 
services admin
9k19.11 Alcohol assessment declined
ZR1E.00 Alcohol dependence scale 9 9 25
ZR1E.11 ADS - Alcohol dependence scale 9 9 25
ZR1F.00 Alcohol use disorders identification test 8 8 40
ZR1F.11 AUDIT - Alcohol use disorders identification 
test
8 8 40
ZR1G.00 Alcohol use inventory
ZR3f.00 Comprehensive drinker profile
ZR3f.11 CDP - Comprehensive drinker profile
ZRa1.00 Michigan alcoholism screening test 4 4 50
ZRa1.11 MAST - Michigan alcoholism screening test 4 4 50
ZRa1100 Brief Michigan alcoholism screening test 6 6
1 Values representing positive screening score provided where relevant, including for men/women as 
appropriate.
2 No specific codes were available to indicate a positive FAST or AUDIT-C test so GPs were asked to add a value 
to a field associated with the code.
3 In addition to standard screening tests, this includes Read Codes representing lower versus higher risk alcohol 
consumption assessments.
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ZRa1111 BMAST - Brief Michigan alcoholism screening 
test
6 6
ZRa1200 Short Michigan alcoholism screening test 3 3 13
ZRa1211 SMAST - Short Michigan alcoholism screening 
test
3 3 13
6892.00 Alcohol consumption screen
68S..00 Alcohol consumption screen
8IA7.00 Alcohol consumption screening test declined
Non-incentivised Alcohol Consumption Read Codes
1361.00 Teetotaller
1361.11 Non-drinker alcohol
1361.12 Non-drinker alcohol
1362.00 Trivial drinker - <1u/day
1362.11 Drinks rarely
1362.12 Drinks occasionally
1363.00 Light drinker - 1-2u/day
1364.00 Moderate drinker - 3-6u/day
1365.00 Heavy drinker - 7-9u/day
1366.00 Very heavy drinker - >9u/day
1367.00 Stopped drinking alcohol
1368.00 Alcohol consumption unknown
1369.00 Suspect alcohol abuse - denied
136A.00 Ex-trivial drinker (<1u/day)
136a.00 Increasing risk drinking
136B.00 Ex-light drinker - (1-2u/day)
136b.00 Feels should cut down drinking
136C.00 Ex-moderate drinker - (3-6u/d)
136c.00 Higher risk drinking
136D.00 Ex-heavy drinker - (7-9u/day)
136d.00 Lower risk drinking
136e.00 Declines to state current alcohol consumption
136E.00 Ex-very heavy drinker-(>9u/d)
136F.00 Spirit drinker
136G.00 Beer drinker
136H.00 Drinks beer and spirits
136I.00 Drinks wine
136J.00 Social drinker
136K.00 Alcohol intake above recommended sensible 
limits
136L.00 Alcohol intake within recommended sensible 
limits
136M.00 Current non drinker
136N.00 Light drinker
136O.00 Moderate drinker
136P.00 Heavy drinker
136Q.00 Very heavy drinker
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136R.00 Binge drinker
136S.00 Hazardous alcohol use
136T.00 Harmful alcohol use
136V.00 Alcohol units per week 14 14 99
136W.00 Alcohol misuse
136X.00 Alcohol units consumed on heaviest drinking 
day
136Z.00 Alcohol consumption NOS
E23..12 Alcohol problem drinking
E250.00 Nondependent alcohol abuse
E250.12 Hangover (alcohol)
E250.14 Intoxication - alcohol
E250000 Nondependent alcohol abuse, unspecified
E250100 Nondependent alcohol abuse, continuous
E250200 Nondependent alcohol abuse, episodic
E250300 Nondependent alcohol abuse in remission
E250z00 Nondependent alcohol abuse NOS
ZV11300 [V]Personal history of alcoholism
ZV4KC00 [V] Alcohol use
Table 2: All Alcohol Advice Read Codes
Read Code Description
Incentivised (DES) Alcohol Advice Read Codes
8CAM.00 Patient advised about alcohol
9k1A.00 Brief intervention for excessive alcohol consumptn completed
9k1B.00 Extended intervention for excessive alcohol consumptn complt
Non-incentivised Alcohol Advice Read Codes
6792 Health ed. - alcohol
67A5.00 Pregnancy alcohol advice
67H0.00 Lifestyle advice regarding alcohol
8BA8.00 Alcohol detoxification
8BAs.00 Alcohol relapse prevention
8BAu.00 Alcohol harm reduction programme
8BAw.00 Alcohol twelve step programme
8CAM000 Advised to abstain from alcohol consumption
8CAv.00 Advised to contact primary care alcohol worker
8CdK.00 Specialist alcohol treatment service signposted
8CE1.00 Alcohol leaflet given
8Cx0200 Family wellbeing discussion about alcohol
8G32.00 Aversion therapy - alcoholism
8H35.00 Admitted to alcohol detoxification centre
8H7p.00 Referral to community alcohol team
8HHe.00 Referral to community drug and alcohol team
8HkG.00 Referral to specialist alcohol treatment service
8HkJ.00 Referral to alcohol brief intervention service
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8Hq..00 Admission to substance misuse detoxification centre
8IA7.00 Alcohol consumption screening test declined
8IAF.00 Brief intervention for excessive alcohol consumptn declined
8IAJ.00 Declined referral to specialist alcohol treatment service
8IAt.00 Extended interven for excessive alcohol consumption declined
8IEA.00 Referral to community alcohol team declined
8W2..00 Refer to MH services deferred until alcohol misuse resolved
9k11.00 Alcohol consumption counselling
9k14.00 Alcohol counselling by other agencies
9NJz.00 In-house alcohol detoxification
9NN2.00 Under care of community alcohol team
Z191.00 Alcohol detoxification
Z191100 Alcohol withdrawal regime
Z191200 Planned reduction of alcohol consumption
Z191211 Alcohol reduction programme
Z191300 Controlled drinking regime
Z191400 Self-monitoring of alcohol intake
Z4B1.00 Alcoholism counselling
ZC22100 Advice to change drink intake
ZC22200 Advice to change alcoholic drink intake
ZC2H.00 Advice to change alcohol intake
ZG23100 Advice on alcohol consumption
ZV6D600 [V]Alcohol abuse counselling and surveillance
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Supplementary file (2) Time series model specification
T le 1: Model specification for time series analysis of all outcomes
Month 1 2  2 2 2 3  111 112 113 11 
Iterv	
on 1 
intercept
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Iterv	
on 1 slope 0 0 0 1 2 3 84 85 86 87
Iterv	
on 2 
intercept
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Iterv	
on 2 slope 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3
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Supplementary file (3) Time trends in new registrations
Figure 4 shows the total number of registrations in THIN across the full analysis period 
(2006-2016) by month and age of patient at the point of registration. This clearly shows that 
registration levels are highest in September and October and that this is driven by increased 
levels of registration in the 16-19 and 20-24 year-old age groups.
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Table 6 shows 16-24 year old registrants as a proportion of all newly registering patients, 
and Figure 5 presents this graphically, further reinforcing that this group are a much greater 
proportion of newly registering patients in September and October than in other months.
Table  !  6-24 year old registrants as a proportion of all newly registering patients
Month
% "# $&'
reg()*rants ag&d 1+,
-.
January 22%
February 22%
March 22%
April 21%
May 21%
June 20%
July 23%
August 21%
September 33%
October 26%
November 23%
December 21%
Figure 2: 16-24 year old registrants as a proportion of all newly registering patients
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This alone is not sufficient to explain the increase in screening /ate0 which we observe in 
these months. For that we must also look at the proportion of eligible patients who are 
screened in each month by age. This is illustrated in Figure 6 which shows a significantly 
elevated rate of screening for 16-24 year olds in September and October (particularly 16-19 
year olds for whom the screening rate triples in September compared to August). Taken 
together, these figures provide compelling evidence for the hypothesis that large numbers 
of students register with new GP practices in September and October, and that practitioners 
are more likely to screen these groups at this time than other ages, or at other times of 
year. 
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Supplementary file (4) Sensitivity analyses
Table 1: All patients recorded as being screened and receiving brief advice, irrespective of whether screening 
result is recorded
Coefficient p-value GJK LM
MontNO since 1st PQR SUUV 0.00 0.976
-
0.02 0.02
WXXect of inteYZ[ntion 1 4.48 <0.001 2.51 6.45
MontNO since iRt[YZention 1 
intY\]^c[] 0.12 <0.001 0.08 0.16
WXXect of inteYZ[ntioR S -4.46 <0.001
-
6.84
-
2.30
MontNO since iRt[YZention S
intY\]^c[] -0.33 <0.001
-
0.45
-
0.20
MRtercept 2.56 <0.001 2.28 2.85
Figure 1: All patients recorded as being screened and receiving brief advice, irrespective of whether 
screening result is recorded
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Table 2: All patients recorded as receiving brief advice or being referred to treatment who were recorded as 
screening positive
Coefficient
p-
value _`a bc
Monhij since 1sh lmo pqqu -0.15 0.22 -0.39 0.02
wxxect of intez{|ntion 1 29.09 <0.001 20.90 37.27
Monhij since ioh|z{ention 1 
inhz}~c|~ 0.48 <0.001 0.20 0.75
wxxect of intez{|ntioo p -19.14 <0.001
-
25.79
-
12.49
Monhij since ioh|z{ention p
inhz}~c|~ -0.72 <0.001 -1.17 -0.28
cotercept 20.01 <0.001 15.82 24.21
Figure 2: All patients recorded as receiving brief advice or being referred to treatment who were recorded as 
screening positive
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Table 3: All patients recorded as receiving brief advice or being referred to treatment who were recorded as 
being screened
Coefficient p-value  
Mon since 1s   -0.03 0.10
-
0.06 0.01
ect of intention 1 6.30 <0.001 4.17 8.44
Mon since iention 1 
inc 0.14 <0.001 0.09 0.19
ect of intentio  -5.08 <0.001
-
7.69
-
2.47
Mon since iention 
inc -0.20 0.01
-
0.36
-
0.05
tercept 5.15 <0.001 4.63 5.67
Figure 3: All patients recorded as receiving brief advice or being referred to treatment who were recorded as 
being screened
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Supplementary file (5) Change point analysis
The R package changepoint was used to identify turning points in each of the three main 
outcomes. This suggested results as illustrated in Figure 5, with the dots representing 
change points and the bars representing 95% confidence intervals around these. 
Figu  h ¡¢ £¤¥¥  ¦ rate of alcohol screening, screen positive and brief advice delive¤
These results provide some evidence for a 6-month lag on the initial effects of introducing 
the intervention, and a 7-10-month lag on the effects or removing it. There is also some 
evidence for a change point in the middle of the intervention period for each outcome, 
although these to not all occur at the same point in time.
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